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The Eurozone Crisis Seen From the Periphery
 The ongoing crisis of the eurozone is often narrated as 
a high-political power play among EU governments, with 
Germany leading the fray and imposing its preferred austerity-
based solutions.  The last issue of the EUSA Review Forum 
discussed whether this meant the return of a “German prob-
lem” in Europe.  In this issue of the EUSA Review, we continue 
to take stock of this major EU crisis.  This time, however, four 
scholars take the perspective of struggling countries in the 
periphery of Europe – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. 
 What is going on in these countries is especially interest-
ing because they have shouldered the heaviest burden of 
adjustment so far.  Austerity is the name of the game, with 
its painful implications – slashed government expenditures, 
higher taxes, and recession.  Yet other member states are 
not at all immune from such predicament.  Last summer, 
Italy became the latest victim of the eurozone crisis.  The 
European Central Bank’s recent decision to inject massive 
liquidities in the form of three-year loans to eurozone banks 
seems to have stemmed the crisis -- at least for now.  But 
unless the contagion is stopped, the list of struggling coun-
tries may still grow, extending perhaps even to France and to 
other core EU member states.  How the peripheral countries 
have fared in the crisis is therefore a harbinger of Europe’s 
fate.  Government and popular responses to the crisis will 
determine the fate of the euro and, more broadly, will have 
a profound impact on national and European politics for the 
foreseeable future.  
 What exactly has changed since 2009, and what does it 
bode for future political attitudes and government policies? 
According to Kevin Featherstone, the Greek people are torn 
between their “pride in a shared (European) identity” and 
their resentment against EU-imposed austerity; social con-
flicts are on the rise, however, as well as “social and political 
alienation”.  More surprisingly perhaps, Brigid Laffan writes 
that the Irish responded have responded “with forbearance 
rather than resistance”; they have broadly supported the 
government’s attempt to restore its creditworthiness through 
austerity.  In Portugal, according to Francisco Torres, the most 
widespread sentiment is that there is no alternative to auster-
ity; many also think that externally imposed adjustment may 
be good for Portugal in the long run.  As for Spain, Kenneth 
Dubin concedes that it is “no longer a hotbed of unconditional 
Euroenthusiasm, but it is hardly a nation of Euroskeptics”; 
the Spaniards continue to positively associate Europe with 
modernity and democracy.  Altogether, these contributions 
underscore the remarkable resilience of peripheral countries 
that have been caught in the vortex of the euro crisis. Yet 
they also point out the looming danger of popular backlash 




Greece: penetrated, bound and committed
Kevin Featherstone
 ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’ have long been impor-
tant référentiels in modern Greece.  They have helped 
to define identity and modernity.  As such, they have 
provided a base for legitimation, but also of calibrating 
the capability of state institutions.   Europe has been a 
paradox for Greece:  pride in a shared identity, mixed 
with angst over the domestic failure to ‘keep up’ with 
Europe’s core.  Thus, many of the questions posed by 
the sovereign debt crisis that emerged in Greece in 2009 
fit into an established historical pattern.  
 The crisis has brought several systemic features 
into sharper relief.  In the bigger picture, EU member-
ship has not served to strengthen the domestic state, as 
liberal intergovernmentalism assumes.  Instead, it has 
been penetrated and made vulnerable: denuded of its 
established protection and patronage, its technocratic 
shortcomings have been exposed.  Thus, suggestions 
that the executive branch of government has been em-
powered need to be tempered: not only can its failings 
appear insuperable; Greek negotiators typically enter 
EU negotiations as policy-takers, marginal to overall 
outcomes, left to justify them at home.  These conditions 
held well before the crisis, but now they are more acute. 
Not sufficiently understood outside Greece is the extent 
of the creditor intervention into the basic operation of 
the state administration.  A ‘Troika’ office has been es-
tablished in Athens to represent the interests of those 
bailing-out Greece since May 2010, to check that the 
‘Memorandum’ conditions are being met.  Composed 
of officials from the EU Commission, the ECB, and the 
IMF, its monitoring across ministries is unprecedented 
and poses both normative questions and issues of ca-
pability for the EU institutions (the IMF is well-seasoned 
in this kind of role).
 The public response has been mixed.  Polls in late 
2011 showed strong majorities opposed to the austerity 
measures.  This is not surprising: austerity has deep-
ened every few months in a climate of great uncertainty. 
By 2013, Greece will be in its fifth consecutive year of 
recession.  Public sector workers have seen across the 
board salary cuts and lay-offs into a ‘labour reserve’ with 
the prospect of redundancy.  Stereotypes of Greeks as 
lazy are unfounded – Greeks and Austrians work 43.7 
hours per week on average, more than the rest of the EU 
(The Guardian, 8 December 2011). The problem is one 
of productivity, which raises wider issues.  Some 40% of 
young people are unemployed. The impact on Greece’s 
social fabric is profound.  Mass protests – and riots – in 
Athens’ central square have been broadcast around the 
world, as was a ‘Madrid-type’ camp - a hotchpotch of 
protestors:  unrepresentative, but ready for interviewing.
 Despite all of this, a December 2011 poll showed 
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70% supporting continued membership of the euro-zone. 
Only the political fringes talk of exit.  There has been no 
surge in euro-scepticism.
 Politically, Premier George Papandreou – elected 
before the crisis in October 2009 – was forced to resign 
last December.  His government had gone through hell. 
The main opposition leader, Antonis Samaras, was ac-
cused of opportunism in repeatedly refusing to back the 
euro-zone bailouts.  To address the legitimacy issue, 
Papandreou proposed a referendum on the latest Eu-
ropean Council measures.  The initiative was botched 
and he was forced to resign.  Samaras agreed to back 
the euro-deal on condition that a short-term technocratic 
prime minister was appointed to head an inter-party 
coalition.  Lucas Papademos, a former Vice President 
of the ECB, was put in a much more precarious position 
as PM than Mario Monti in Italy.  The inter-party deal as-
sumes elections in the early spring of 2012.  However, 
recent polls show no party likely to win a parliamentary 
majority.  Papademos may be given a new mandate. 
2012 is likely to be a period of political instability, with 
the political extremes benefitting but no strong leader 
emerging.  Although the Greek political elite is criticized 
for the accumulation of state failures, it has not yet faced 
its ‘Tagentopoli’ moment.  
 The Greek case reminds us of the importance of 
centre-periphery differences within the EU and the chal-
lenge of managing a heterogeneous currency union 
with near-failing states.  These conditions ought to have 
prompted an economic union at Maastricht.  But the case 
also warns of the dangers of the EU imposing unremitting 
austerity: social and political alienation, when growth is 
a shared interest.  What was ‘Europe’ for, again?
Kevin Featherstone, London School of Economics
Ireland: From Boom to Bubble to Bust
Brigid Laffan
 Irish society has lived with the financial crisis for more 
than three years.  On the 28th of September 2008 the 
then Irish Government guaranteed the vast bulk of bank 
liabilities without knowing the extent of the toxic assets 
in those banks. Ireland’s problems were not caused by 
an excess of sovereign debt. In socialising the liabilities 
of the banks, the Government undermined its own fis-
cal standing. Nor did Ireland wait for the imposition of 
austerity from outside. In April 2009, the government 
introduced an emergency budget, the first in a series of 
austerity budgets that will continue to 2014. Prior to the 
bailout, Ireland experienced a 21% decline in GDP by 
2010 from its peak in 2007. The collapse was too great 
for Ireland to cope with. An outflow of capital, reliance 
on the ECB for liquidity and widening spreads made the 
November 2010 rescue inevitable.  It would be impos-
sible to overstate the deep shock this has caused. The 
Irish state, even when poor, was always able to fund 
itself and never defaulted in its history. 
 On the face of it, Irish society has responded to what 
has happened with forbearance rather than resistance. 
The strikes and civil unrest that have characterised re-
actions in other countries is strangely absent in Ireland. 
An anti-austerity march on October 22, 2011 could only 
muster 2,000 participants. It would be wrong to interpret 
this as an absence of deep anger. In February 2011, 
when the Irish electorate was afforded an opportunity 
to pass judgement on the then Government, it reduced 
the once dominant ruling political party, Fianna Fáil, to 
20 seats in parliament and only one seat in the greater 
Dublin area. It was an earthquake election. 
 It is difficult to assess the impact of the crisis on re-
lations between Ireland and the EU as the programme 
requires a further 15 billion euros of austerity measures 
by 2014. There are multiple negative feedback loops 
across the Eurozone member states.  The Irish public 
and elite opinion reacted very negatively to the punitive 
interest rates that were initially charged on the loans. 
There remains widespread opposition to the ECB’s in-
sistence that Ireland repay all bondholders even those 
not covered by a legal guarantee.  November brought 
a sharp reminder of the loss of sovereignty when a 
Bundestag Committee saw projections of the 2012 Irish 
budget before the Irish parliament did. Equity is also a 
concern in public debate. Greece got a haircut on its 
debt while Irish taxpayers are expected to continue to 
shoulder a heavy debt burden that helped avoid an im-
plosion of Europe’s financial system. So far, a majority 
(46%) of the Irish electorate believe that Ireland should 
continue to comply with the terms of the bailout although 
a sizeable minority (30%) disagree and 20% expressed 
no view.    Britain’s veto of treaty reform has done the 
Irish government a service because it reduces the need 
for a referendum on the intergovernmental treaty that is 
now in prospect. Polls suggest that a referendum would 
not be carried. A decision on whether or not a referendum 
is required will be taken after the treaty format has been 
decided. 
 Ireland is the best performing of the programme 
countries. Competitiveness and growth have returned 
driven by a booming export sector and a reduction in unit 
labour costs. However, unemployment is rising (14.6%), 
emigration has accelerated and the domestic economy 
continues to decline. If the bailout strategy does not work 
in Ireland, it will not work in the other peripheral countries. 
Ireland may however be overwhelmed again if conditions 
in the wider Eurozone continue to deteriorate.
 The Irish Government has decided to play a long 
game. It favours enhanced economic governance in 
the euro zone but put the sustainability of Irish debt on 
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the table at the December 2011 European Council.  Es-
sentially the aim is to re-work the Irish debt burden over 
a longer time frame and at reduced interest rates. It is 
not in Ireland’s interests to default as a sovereign given 
its reliance on inward investment and exports. Whatever 
bargaining chips Ireland holds will be used with care to 
facilitate a re-entry into the bond markets. A state that 
cannot fund itself is no longer interdependent in the EU 
but dependent on it. Ireland joined the EU to escape 
dependence. 
  As long as the situation in Europe remains unstable, 
the Irish Government has to navigate the pressures ema-
nating from the domestic and the EU. Just how long any 
Government can manage sustained austerity is difficult 
to judge. There may well be a tipping point into social 
unrest but so far, the Irish Government, economy and 
society have displayed considerable resilience. 
Brigid Laffan, University College Dublin
Portugal: a Chance to Implement Previously 
Adopted Objectives
Francisco Torres
 In spite of the harsh adjustment programme, Portugal 
has not been turning against the EU nor is it focusing 
on any renegotiation strategy. There is a relatively broad 
understanding that the adjustment programme, irrespec-
tive of other developments in the Eurozone, is the only 
way of returning to a sustainable development path.
The country’s financial position has been fragile, with 
accumulated external imbalances, and high risks asso-
ciated with the costs of servicing the (largely externally 
held) debt. Therefore, it was essential for the govern-
ment to credibly pre-commit to medium-term budgetary 
objectives with accelerated corrective measures in the 
face of the 2009 fiscal overrun.  However, fiscal policy 
remained inadequately expansive in the run-up to the 
general elections in autumn 2009. As a result, the ratio 
of government deficit to GDP jumped from 3.6% in 2008 
to 10.1% in 2009 and 9.8% in 2010. 
 In March 2011, the national parliament rejected the 
government’s austerity programme, which triggered 
the fall of the incumbent Socialist government and was 
followed by Portugal’s request of financial assistance. 
The caretaker Portuguese government signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding on specific economic policy 
conditionality and a Loan Agreement before the June 
general elections, with the formal consent of the two 
main opposition centre-right parties, PSD and CDS. 
 The election resulted in a new government led by a 
PSD-CDS coalition. Yet, the main opposition party, the 
PS, had supported the outgoing government that signed 
the MoU and maintained a relatively cooperative role. 
Portugal’s economic and financial adjustment pro-
gramme was tabled for the period 2011 to mid-2014, 
including “structural reforms to boost potential growth, 
create jobs, and improve competitiveness; a fiscal 
consolidation strategy, supported by structural fiscal 
measures and better fiscal control over public-private-
partnerships and state-owned enterprises, aimed at 
putting the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio on a firm 
downward path in the medium term and reducing the 
deficit below 3 % of GDP by 2013; a financial sector 
strategy based on recapitalisation and deleveraging, 
with efforts to safeguard the financial sector against dis-
orderly deleveraging through market based mechanisms 
supported by backstop facilities” (EU Council decision 
of 17 May 2011).
 According to the Second Review Mission to Portugal 
by the EC, ECB, and IMF (MEMO/11/793, 16/11/2011), 
the implementation of the 2011 budget got off to a good 
start. On the expenditure side, the measures included 
an average cut of 5% in government wages, reductions 
in government payroll lists, cuts in social transfers, and 
a freeze of essentially all other social outlays. Measures 
have also been aimed at gaining control on spending, 
in particular in the health and public sectors. Consolida-
tion efforts on the revenue side consisted mainly of a 2 
percentage-point increase in the standard VAT rate in 
January 2011. 
 Spending overruns led the government to resort to 
extraordinary measures in 2011, which will lower the 
government deficit to 4%, significantly below the target of 
5.9. The deficit for 2012 remains under upward pressure. 
The EU-IMF mission’s assessment is that the fiscal target 
of 4.5% of GDP can be met. But this will be achieved 
through a reduction of public sector wages and pensions, 
with the elimination of 2 out of 14 annual payments for 
those earning more than 1100 euros, a measure whose 
constitutionality has been challenged. 
 The government has been criticized by the minority 
left parties in parliament for being ‘too obedient to the 
German Diktat’. Yet, it has stood rather firmly by its com-
mitments, stressing the broad parliamentary consensus 
behind its austerity programme and its determination 
in pursuing all of the agreed objectives. So far, there is 
however no consensus to enshrine a debt brake in the 
constitution. Trade unions have been protesting against 
labour market reform and austerity. But these protests 
have not crystallized major conflicts or had a lasting 
impact, except for one-off strikes primarily affecting the 
public and transportation sectors. There is no strongly 
negative popular sentiment towards the EU. The public 
perceives the sheer magnitude of the crisis and the need 
to tackle the accumulated imbalances and the financing 
problems of the Portuguese economy. Political and social 
tensions have not been particularly high either. In fact, 
the curbing of unjustified and decades-long rent-seeking, 
privileges, and mismanagement – especially in local 
and regional government, in the health sector and in 
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the public sector – may lead to increased public scrutiny 
and transparency. It could also perhaps contribute to a 
better redistribution of income, which has been one of 
the worst in the EU.
 Portugal typically tends to carry out reforms in times 
of crisis, when there is external pressure. Budgetary 
consolidation and structural reform are now being 
implemented thanks to market pressure and EU/IMF 
conditionality. Portugal has committed itself to fiscal 
adjustment and structural reform. It is still early to tell 
whether the current adjustment programme will succeed. 
It depends both on the country’s capacity to push reforms 
through a period of negative growth and high unemploy-
ment (forecast to approach 14 per cent in 2013) and 
on how the eurozone will handle its overall institutional 
challenges.
Francisco Torres, Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Spain: Europe is Still the Answer
Kenneth A. Dubin
 After more than a decade of strong economic growth 
(or, if one prefers, a mirage of brick and mortar) from the 
mid-1990s through mid-2007, Spaniards were among 
the most enthusiastic European citizens.  In spring 2007, 
73% declared that EU membership was generally a good 
thing, more than twenty points higher than Greeks, Ital-
ians or Portuguese.   During 2010, with unemployment 
spiraling toward 20% and the markets turning on Span-
ish debt, confidence in the EU’s ability to solve the crisis 
declined by 23% in just six months, the most precipitous 
decline in Europe.   In 2007, 65% said they tended to 
trust EU institutions; by spring 2011, that figure was only 
39% (about the EU-27 average).  More troubling, still, is 
the steadily declining number who believe that EU mem-
bership has been beneficial for their country, from 75% 
in spring 2007 to only 39% (2 points below the EU-27 
average) in spring 2011.   Only 48% of Spaniards (74% 
in 2007) are optimistic about the EU’s future. 
 Confidence in national political institutions has de-
clined even further, however.  Less than a quarter say 
they tend to trust their national parliament or govern-
ment.   While about 50% find corruption to be relatively 
common at the EU level, more than 70% believe it to be 
widespread in national, regional and local politics.   Not 
surprisingly, then, Spaniards overwhelmingly support 
EU-level solutions to a range of economic challenges in 
significantly higher numbers than do their counterparts 
in Greece, Italy and Portugal.    In November 2011, 63% 
of Spaniards continued to support the euro.   Spain may 
no longer be a hotbed of unconditional Euroenthusiasm, 
but it is hardly a nation of Euroskeptics.
 Spaniards’ continuing support for the European 
project is grounded in a collective belief that Europe is 
central to the twin national projects of modernization—
economic, political and social—and democratization. 
Spaniards were more likely than any other EU citizens 
to choose the words “modern” and “democratic” to de-
scribe the EU project.   Over the last half of the twentieth 
century, overwhelming majorities on both the Left and the 
Right came to believe that European integration was the 
key to Spain’s flight from backwardness and fratricidal 
conflict.  
 Does the Popular Party’s (PP) absolute majority in 
November’s general election thus mean an overwhelm-
ing, if reluctant endorsement for the ECB-German aus-
terity recipe to be administered by Luis de Guindos, the 
new minister of Economics Affairs and former head of 
Lehman Brothers in Spain and Portugal?  
 At first glance, one might conclude that the PP’s 
absolute majority means that the indignados movement 
has had little real impact on Spanish politics.  However, 
it is important to remember that this multitudinous rejec-
tion of austerity attracted the interest of approximately 
75% of Spaniards; of these, some 70% saw the move-
ment as positive or mostly positive.   In truth, the depth 
of the PP’s mandate is questionable.  The PP secured 
10,866,566 votes (44.62%), increasing their vote total by 
only 588,556 versus the 2008 elections (422,769 fewer 
votes than the Socialists received in 2008).  The Social-
ists, meanwhile, lost almost 4.3 million votes compared 
with 2008 and obtained only 110 seats in the Congress 
of Deputies, their worst showing since the Transition to 
democracy.  Abstention increased five points, from 26.1-
31.1% of the electorate and support for third parties also 
increased significantly.  In other words, the real story of 
these elections was the Socialists’ collapse and not the 
PP’s dominance. 
 Eurobarometer data reveals that Spaniards are 
among the least informed Europeans.  Their histori-
cally strong support for the EU is grounded in an idea 
of Europe that casts political and economic integration 
as the solution to the country’s historical defects and 
contemporary foibles; for most Spaniards, dissatisfaction 
with specific European policies (when they are aware of 
them) provokes little more than grumbles, as uniquely 
Spanish solutions are viewed as potentially far worse. 
As a consequence, even if the deepening of austerity 
imposed by the PP is a response to demands from other 
EU member states and EU institutions, should austerity 
make matters worse in Spain, then the PP, not the EU, 
will be the central object of citizens’ ire.  Social conflict in 
Spain may well increase significantly in the near future; 
the EU however, enjoys sufficient goodwill in Spain to 
remain largely above the fray.
Kenneth A. Dubin, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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EU and the Developing World
Interest Section
The EU in Africa: managing the rise of China
Daniela Sicurelli
 When the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation took place in Beijing, in 2000, it 
was clear for ministers of both sides that the interests of 
China on Africa were growing exponentially. China was 
increasing its presence in Africa through trade, direct 
investments, low-interest loans and diplomatic rela-
tions. Still, when African minister flew to Beijing in 2006 
to agree on a common action plan with China, the EU 
realized it was unprepared to face this change. In 2007, 
the then High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, Javier Solana, acknowledged that 
the rise of China in Africa represented a challenge for the 
EU (Solana 2007). In the same year, the EU and African 
governments agreed on an inter-regional Strategic Part-
nership in Lisbon in order to improve dialogue between 
the two parties. Attempts of the European institutions to 
foster trilateral cooperation with China and Africa also 
followed. So far, though, the EU is still struggling to adjust 
its Africa policy to the changed context. 
 This article investigates the nature of these chal-
lenges and the reasons why the attempts of European 
institutions to face the growing role of China in Africa 
have failed. It argues that this change in Chinese for-
eign policy has both economic consequences for the 
European states and implications on the identity of the 
EU as a development leader and model. The inability 
of the EU to adjust to the new context is due both to 
institutional and ideational obstacles to policy change. 
Divisions between European institutions, their lack of 
understanding of China’s Africa policy and the resistance 
of the European model of development to adapt to local 
demands prevented it to manage these challenges ef-
fectively.
 Firstly, China emerged as a competitor of the EU in 
the import of raw materials. In the ‘90s, with the opening 
of new markets in the countries previously under Soviet 
control, European trade with Africa stagnated. Since the 
early 2000s, with the emerging of China as an importer 
from Africa, the share of trade flows between Europe 
and Africa has further decreased. Still, EU member 
states remained the major trading partners of African 
countries. Parallel to the increase of Chinese import, the 
total amount of European trade flows with Africa started 
rising again (Lirong 2011). According to Eurostat (2010) 
from 2002 to 2008 trade flows between the EU member 
states and Africa increased ten-fold. This increase is 
especially evident in the cases of oil and gas, where 
interests of the EU on Africa have been revitalized, due 
to the ongoing instability in the Middle East (Ogunleye 
2011). 
 So far the attempts of the EU to preserve prefer-
ential trade relations with African countries have been 
frustrated. Negotiations for the Economic Partnership 
Agreements between the EU and African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries (ACP), started in 2007, stressed the 
divergence between the interests of the European and 
African negotiators. The reluctance of the EU negotiators 
to make concessions raised contestation among African 
leaders against the coherence of European trade and 
development policies (Elgström 2009). The cleavages 
between the EU and African governments in the Doha 
development round of the WTO further remarked the 
distance between the two parties. In this context, the 
increasing trade ties between Africa and China contrib-
uted weakening the negotiating position of the EU.
 A second area of contrast with China is the promo-
tion of a model of development. Even though China 
participated in UN peace operations in Africa and ratified 
several UN treaties on human rights, Hu Jintao’s govern-
ment remarked its distance with the Western, and, more 
specifically, European approach to development cooper-
ation. As opposed to the EU, it refused the label of donor, 
criticizing the asymmetric relationship European states 
have traditionally established with aid recipients, while 
stressing its role as equal partner. The model promoted 
by the Chinese government notably differs from that of 
the EU for its no-strings-attached approach. In contrast 
to European democracy promotion programs, Chinese 
aid mainly focused on short term tangible results, such 
as infrastructure and direct investments. 
 With the growing role of China in Africa, African 
leaders have had more opportunities to voice their op-
position to the European model of development. Both 
African governments and regional organizations have 
increasingly charged the EU with neo-colonial ambitions, 
based on the use of double-standards and coercive 
tools of foreign policy such as sanctions and barriers to 
African trade (Sicurelli 2010). Democratic African gov-
ernments did perceive China as a threat to consolida-
tion of democracy in Africa. At the same time, though, 
the African Union explicitly welcomed the pragmatic 
approach of the Chinese government to development 
and conflict management (Taylor 2011). As Howorth 
(2011) noted, despite its “principled foreign policy”, the 
EU proved unable to face accusations of selectivity and 
lack of coherence. These limits hindered the role of the 
EU in its value competition with emerging powers. This 
is especially evident in its relations with Africa.
 As a reaction to these challenges, the EU produced 
several official documents that called for improving coor-
dination with China to pursue shared goals. In 2006, the 
European Commission (2006) issued a Communication 
on “EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities, 
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for a strategic partnership with China”. One year later, 
the European Parliament published a resolution on 
“China’s policy and its effects on Africa”. In 2008, the 
Commission released a second Communication, on 
“The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue 
and cooperation”. This rhetorical exercise, though, was 
not met by concrete steps towards joint projects with 
China and reforms of European development policies. 
Carbone (2011) explains this difficulty showing how the 
institutional structure of the EU constrained effective 
decision-making. The European institutions were not 
able to conciliate their different goals and interests on 
the topic, and divisions within the Commission and the 
Council weakened the European position substantially. 
Besides, so far Africa did not rank among the priorities 
of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy appointed in 2009, Catherine 
Ashton. The slow reaction of the EU to the North African 
crisis in 2011 and inability to take a unitary position of 
on intervention in Libya was emblematic of the lack of a 
clear strategy in the EU’s Africa policy.
 Furthermore, having underestimated the potential of 
Chinese development cooperation, the EU failed at fully 
understanding Chinese Africa policy, which prevented it 
to find potential rooms to cooperate to achieve shared 
goals. EU officials claimed that Chinese policies rep-
resent a threat to human rights. Rather than negating 
human rights, though, the Chinese approach to develop-
ment aimed at fostering collective development as the 
premise to human rights promotion (Taylor 2011). This 
misunderstanding has contributed to the inability of the 
EU to identify complementarities with China’s Africa 
policy and turned out to be an obstacle to diplomatic 
dialogue. 
 Given the increasing contestation of its policies and 
the growing attractiveness of China as a partner for Afri-
can governments, the EU engaged in attempts to reform 
its development strategy. In order to address criticisms 
against the paternalistic undertones of its method of de-
mocracy promotion, the EU Strategy for Africa, adopted 
by the European Council in 2005, endorsed the principle 
of African ownership of development promoted by the 
World Bank since 2003 (Woods 2008). Like the Bank, 
though, the EU is still struggling to clarify the operational 
details to integrate this concept into its democracy pro-
motion agenda. These difficulties have been especially 
evident in the implementation of the Africa-EU partner-
ship on democratic governance and human rights. 
 To preserve its trade ties with African governments 
and, contextually, improve its image as a development 
leader, the EU needs to address the demands of its 
African partners concerning market access and support 
for African-lead projects of development. Besides, it is 
crucial for the EU to identify fields where cooperation 
with China is possible and where the contribution of the 
two actors can be considered complementary. To that 
purpose, EU leaders should promote regular senior level 
meetings with representative of the Chinese and African 
governments in order to improve communication and 
learning between the parties. Finally, it is paramount that 
the EU works on the operationalization of the principle of 
local ownership. It needs to clarify the instruments and 
steps to actively involve local leaders and organizations 
in the elaboration of development programs, without un-
dermining its efforts of democracy promotion. Unless the 
EU undertakes these steps, its diplomatic power on the 
African governments is expected to deteriorate further, 
leaving room of manoeuvre to the rising development 
leader.
Daniela Sicurelli, University of Trento
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The Perceptions of the EU in Latin America
 Roberto Dominguez
Introduction
 The study of the image of the EU in third coun-
tries became part of the scholarly research agenda in 
the late 1990s. Since then, research on this topic has 
experienced a significant proliferation with studies led 
by Chaban and Holland (2008) as well as Fioramonti 
and Lucarelli (2008), just to mention a couple of pi-
oneering scholars. In the case of Latin America, the 
study of perceptions of the EU in Latin America is in 
its initial stages and to great extent the inquiry about 
the perceptions of the EU in Latin America remains 
unanswered. In this regard, the argument developed 
in the following paragraphs is that the perceptions of 
the EU in Latin America are in contrast with the EU’s 
self-representations. This is explained by the fact that 
despite an overall positive perception of the EU in 
Latin America, there are some variations depending 
of the specific nature and interests of the EU bilateral 
agenda with particular countries.  
 
The Self-Representation of EU as 
International Actor
 For several decades scholars have addressed 
the analytical challenge of deciphering the complexity 
of the EU as international actor (for instance Manners 
2002; Sjursen 2005). As the EU has strengthened its 
institutions and policies in the area of external rela-
tions, the analytical challenge is not only the type of 
EU actorness (civilian power, normative power and 
gentle power, for instance), but also the effectiveness 
of the policies projected abroad.  The EU projects both 
voluntarily and involuntarily international presence/
image. While the former is reflected in the goals and 
objectives of foreign policy and purposely the EU de-
velop policies to fulfill them, the later escapes out of its 
influence an result out of the mere existence of the EU 
(current economic crisis, for instance).  
 Thus, the self-representation of the EU is a pa-
rameter to identify the gap between the expectations 
of the EU as an international actor and the perceptions 
of the others. More precisely, the EU is endowed with 
institutional instruments such as the combined post of 
High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission 
(HRVP) and the creation of the European External Ac-
tion Service (EEAS) supporting this post. Not only are 
both actors relevant in the promotion of the image of 
the EU, but also all EU institutions that in some way 
project an image. The common goal or expected self-
image of their activity is based on the spirit enshrined 
in the consolidated version of the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union (Treaty of Lisbon), particularly in Article 21 
(2), which include the safeguard of values and funda-
mental interests; the consolidation of democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights; the preservation of peace 
and prevention of conflicts; and the support to sus-
tainable economic, social and environmental develop-
ment of developing countries, among other objectives.
 Thus, the underlying assumption of the self-
perception is that the EU follows values and princi-
ples translated into policies and actions that provide 
a distinctive actorness to the EU different from those 
of nation-states and other international organizations 
(Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2009). 
Perceptions of the EU
 Based on the analysis of surveys and print me-
dia in four of the main EU partners in Latin America 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) between 
2009 and 2011, one can extrapolate some estimates 
about the perceptions of the EU in the Latin American 
subcontinent. 
 The industry of opinion polls in Latin America 
has mushroomed in the past 15 years. However, polls 
including the perceptions of the EU remain limited and 
sporadic due to the overwhelming role of other items 
of the Latin agenda such as the relationship with the 
United States or immediate challenges facing national 
foreign policy. Despite these limitations, Latinobaró-
metro has over the years included a small number of 
questions on the EU in its annual public opinion sur-
veys in the region. One of the most consistent ques-
tions in the Latinobarómetro survey focuses on the 
opinion of the state of the relations between the EU 
and particular countries. While the four countries hold 
a positive perception of the EU, Chile is the country that 
has the best perception of the EU (92 percent in 2004 
and 96 percent in 2010), while Argentina’s views have 
varied between  71.9 percent in 2008 to 82.3 percent 
in 2006 mainly due to agricultural disputes.       
Colombia has also experienced a nadir (76.2 in 2004) 
due to the worsening of the war between the govern-
ment and the guerilla groups and the EU criticisms of 
human rights violations; against this precedent, the re-
lations between the EU and Colombia improved and 
paved the way for the negotiation and conclusion of an 
association agreement (89 percent in 2010). Interest-
ingly, the variations in the cases of Chile and Mexico 
are alike, which is consistent with the fact that both 
countries have association agreements in place with 
the EU since the early 2000s. 
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  The positive perception of the EU contrasts 
with the weak knowledge of the members of the EU 
in the Latin American public opinion. In 2004, in re-
sponse to the inquiry of mentioning the members of 
the EU, Mexico ranked the highest with 4.1 correct an-
swers, Chile 3.75, Argentina 2.82 and Colombia 1.4. 
As a follow up, the countries that were identified by the 
public opinion were Spain 36 percent, France 28 per-
cent, Italy 26 percent and Germany 25 percent (Lagos 
2011).
 In the case of newspapers, a review of 1,685 
news items published in the four Latin American news-
papers between 2009 and 20111   (Dominguez 2011) 
indicates that the economic events in the EU received 
most of the attention in the news items with 51.57 per-
cent of the total, followed by the news on EU politics 
(33.7) and EU social issues (14.73).
 The general trend in the economic arena has 
been the steady attention to the European econom-
ic crisis, with more emphasis in the Argentinean and 
Chilean press, economies where the trade share with 
the European Union is high. The second area with-
in the economic framework was trade:  Mexico and 
Chile registered the lowest interest in trade because 
both countries have already implemented associa-
tion agreements. Conversely, Colombia showcased 
high coverage of the negotiations for the association 
agreement with the European Union, underscoring 
the distinct positions of the Colombian and European 
negotiation teams. Argentina, on the other hand, ex-
perienced an increasing debate in press in light of the 
restart of the negotiations between the EU and MER-
COSUR in 2010 and posed a critical position to the 
protectionist EU policies in the agricultural sector, par-
ticularly with regard to the Hilton quota beef.
  Within the political frame, the EU received 
more attention in the area of external relations (58.6 
percent of the political frame) in comparison to politi-
cal events taking place within the borders of the EU 
(41.3 percent). In the former, while a great share of in-
formation peripherally mentioned the EU among other 
international actors, particularly the United States, the 
role of the EU as international actor was also under-
scored by the press in the EU policies towards Iran, 
Libya, Cuba and Haiti.  In the latter, with regard to the 
political developments within the EU, the news items 
were focused on the problems of the ratification and 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, politics in Spain, 
the crisis of political parties to assertively face the eco-
nomic crisis, as well as the controversies around the 
Schengen area.
  The social frame received less attention in 
the press. Under this classification, three main areas 
stand out: the environmental model of the EU,  the 
controversies around migration and the social prob-
lems of unemployment. Other sets of news focus are 
the emerging social movements as a result of the 
2008-2012 economic crises, EU educational policies 
and the outbreak of health alerts and the responses of 
the EU.
  The news items were also coded with regard to 
the central role of the EU in the narrative of the news. 
The EU was the central actor in 39 percent of the news 
items, while the European Commission was also the 
central actor in 20 percent of the news, followed by the 
European Central Bank, the Council of the EU/Euro-
pean Council, the European Parliament, the High rep-
resentative of Foreign Policy and the EU delegations 
in the country. With regard to the EU members, Ger-
many received most of the attention of the press in the 
four countries. In line with the historical links, Spain 
was ranked second and France was third. The United 
Kingdom kept a discreet role in the four countries, re-
ceiving more attention in Argentina due to the disputes 
regarding oil resources and the Falkland Islands. In 
this period, four countries were the center of attention 
as sources of instability: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Italy.
 
Conclusion: Link between Self-Representation 
and Perception
 Four different levels of linkages were identi-
fied between self-representation, as portrayed in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, and images, as analyzed in surveys 
and print media. The first level relates to the match 
between projection of the image of policy goals and 
the perception in Latin America. The four case studies 
perceived the self-representation of the EU as an en-
vironmental actor promoting multilateral cooperation 
and good global governance, particularly as a result of 
the EU’s activism in implementing the Kyoto protocol 
on climate change and its position in the Copenhagen 
environmental summit.  
 The second level consists of those cases in 
which, while the EU’s image in Latin America corre-
sponds to the self-representation of the EU, the pro-
jection of the EU image was relatively weak or attenu-
ated by the presence of other actors. This is the case 
where the EU projected its civilian power in mediation 
of international conflicts or assisting countries, but as a 
secondary actor and overshadowed by United States. 
 The third level noticed a gap between the self-
representation of the EU and the perceptions of the 
third countries in the four case studies. This occurred 
in the area of the EU as an actor advancing interna-
tional free trade. Particularly in Argentina, the image 
of the EU protecting the agricultural market was com-
monly portrayed in the press; to a lesser extent, the 
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Colombian press also asserted this characteristic dur-
ing the negotiations of the association agreement. The 
fourth level identified assumptions and policies that 
were not confirmed or only implicitly suggested by the 
information in the three areas of analysis: the EU as a 
possible counterbalance to the US hegemony; the EU 
as a model of regional integration; and the EU as an 
effective actor to eradicate poverty.
Roberto Dominguez, Suffolk University
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Book Reviews
of values presented at the beginning of the chapter. A 
short conclusion ends each chapter. In each chapter, 
two main analyses are followed. First, A. Williams does 
not only look at how the EU should behave regarding 
each value. He looks also at how the EU really behaves. 
Among the examples that are discussed are the action 
of the EU in the Yugoslavian war. Second, the various 
dimensions of each value are analyzed. For instance, 
Liberty means both the EU’s role in maintaining freedom 
against external interference and the EU’s relationship 
with its ‘constituents’ (p.208).
 The strength of the book is that it provides a 
coherent overview of what the EU is and what it does, 
but also where it might be going. A. Williams tries to 
simplify the structures of the EU, especially the role 
of the European Court of Justice, as well as the philo-
sophical discourse inherent to the “values” of Europe, 
in a manner that makes the subject easily accessible to 
non-specialists. The structure of each chapter, historical 
overview, followed by analysis of the various aspects of 
each value, is really convincing. The conclusions at the 
end of each chapter are also very helpful in clarifying 
the argument. While A. Williams presents a strong argu-
ment for the need to revise a Bill of Rights for Europe 
and the EU institutional structure, he is less convincing 
at defining in a concrete way the institutional reforms 
that are necessary for the reformulation of the EU as a 
“just” institution. The assumptions remain sometimes 
too theoretical (chapter 8). However, in a context where 
the future of Europe seems highly unpredictable, “The 
Ethos of Europe” gives an insightful explanation of 
where the EU should go.
Selma Bendjaballah, Science Po, Paris
Dyson, Kenneth and Quaglia, Lucia. European 
Economic Governance and Policies. Oxford University 
Press, 2010.
 In two volumes entitled European Economic Gover-
nance and Policies, published in 2010, Kenneth Dyson 
and Lucia Quaglia bring together many of the original 
documents of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
In these volumes, the authors lay down the historical, 
institutional and policy context of the birth story of EMU 
and the subsequent decade. These volumes are impor-
tant as they deal with documents that are at the cradle 
of Europe’s single currency, one of the most important 
institutional, economic, political and policy integration 
projects that gave rise to the creation of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) comprising the countries that have 
adopted the euro (V. I, p. 6). EMU has played a contra-
Andrew Williams. The Ethos of Europe. Values, Law, 
and Justice in the EU. Cambridge University Press, 
2010.
 How the EU could become a just institution ? 
That is the question Andrew Williams tries to answer in 
this book untitled “The Ethos of Europe. Values, law and 
justice in the EU”. The question could seem at first sight 
rather provocative. Indeed, it has largely been assumed 
that the EU, despite major political indeterminacies 
underlined by the current economic crisis (Federal-
ism vs inter-governmentalism; democratic deficit), is 
based on “just” values. Democracy, rule of law, human 
rights, respect and protection for minorities, form some 
rules- the ethos according to A. Williams- the EU claim 
to be its own. However, Andrew Williams’ book is not a 
purely philosophical essay on “justice”. Instead, “The 
Ethos of Europe” is highly accessible. Its author offers 
a readable point of view at the classical questions on 
the EU, but with an original input.
 The volume is divided into two sections and nine 
chapters. The first section of the book is composed of 
the first six chapters. It addresses notions of peace, 
rule of law, human rights, democracy and liberty in the 
context of the EU. The second part of the book is divided 
into three chapters. The main argument of the author is 
developed: the EU suffers from an uncertain soul. The 
values the EU claims to be its own are deeply indeter-
minate. And to reduce the indeterminacy of these values 
in the EU, “both a revised Bill of Rights for Europe and 
a revised institutional structure of principles capable of 
understanding, monitoring and enforcing such rights 
effectively” are required (p. 20). 
 Chapter one describes the main objectives of 
the book. Among them, A. Williams intends to discuss 
the role and the place of law in the institutional ethos 
of the EU. Chapters two, three, four, five and six pro-
vide an overview of the history of each value. The next 
chapter presents a discussion of the philosophy of EU 
law. Chapters eight and nine present Williams’ argument 
for a research agenda for a “just’” institution. Among 
the assumptions the author proposes, the recognition 
of human rights as a core value in the revised Bill of 
Rights for Europe (p. 336). 
Each chapter in “The Ethos of Europe” is structured 
similarly, starting with a short introduction, a description 
of historical processes through political declarations 
or Treaty articles, and then moving to discuss the role 
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dictory role in the European integration project. On one 
hand EMU served in strengthening the “differentiated 
integration in European macro-economic governance 
and policies” (V. II, p. 10). On the other hand EMU has 
been a uniting power for the integration project (V. II, 
p. 10). 
 Regardless of the effect of the creation of the single 
market, EMU and other institutions in the European 
Union (EU), a ‘new Europe’ in macro-economic gover-
nance has emerged that was beyond the vision of the 
1930s and post-World War II scholars. The ECB was 
designed as an institution that would implement a single 
monetary policy first and foremost seeking to secure 
price stability in the euro area. This could have worked 
well if the euro area “functioned in an environment of 
legal, economic and political uncertainties that gener-
ated confusion, not least a serious lack of transparency 
surrounding European macro-economic governance” 
(V. II, p. 2). However, despite all this advancement and 
progress, an open-ended question that remains unan-
swered, which the 2008 financial crisis brought to the 
forefront—as highlighted in the European Economic 
Governance and Policies: “if there is a ‘new Europe’ in 
macro-economic governance and policies, is Europe 
adequately equipped, not just in policy instruments 
but also in underlying political solidarity, to tackle the 
spectrum of challenges that it is likely to face?” (V. I, p. 
1). The financial crisis raises the question whether the 
EU will “identify and tackle the rationale for strength-
ened economic policy coordination” (V. I, p. 767). Will 
the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis push 
the EU members to finish what they started regarding 
EMU? 
 The two volumes offer a reading of the original 
documents based on delicate selection criteria for the 
official documents and treaties. The volumes are infor-
mative and the reader can trace the sequence of events 
leading to EMU design, creation and performance back 
to pre-1945 period. The importance of going back to 
the roots of the creation of economic governance in the 
EU, rather than referring only to secondary sources is 
“to uncover what expert and political elites meant when 
they wrote about European macro-economic gover-
nance and policies and how and why these meanings 
have changed” over time (volume II, p. 11). Another 
reason for going back to original texts, documents, 
speeches, elite interviews and minutes of meetings, 
etc., according to Dyson and Quaglia, is to offer a fresh 
and new reading of the creation and function of EMU 
since there is a gap in the social sciences resulting from 
using secondary literature and ignoring the examination 
of original documents, which might lead sometimes to 
misinterpretation or misunderstanding of European 
macro-economic governance and policies (V. I, p. 3, 
see also V. I and II, Introduction).
 The first volume gives a detailed political (both in-
ternational and domestic), institutional, economic and 
technical account of creating EMU supported by the 
original documents in addition to the main debates, 
negotiations, discussions and difficulties facing the lead-
ers at that time. It also shows the influence of domestic 
calculations on the entire process. The analysis covers 
original documents dating back to even before 1914 to 
discuss the long ambition and dream of establishing 
“an economic and monetary union in Europe” (V. I, p. 
6). The second volume analyzes the main documents 
focusing on the policies and technicalities of EMU from 
its launch on January 1, 1999 through the first ten years 
of its functioning and concluding with the global financial 
crisis and the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. As a 
complementary volume to Dyson’s edited book (2008) 
The Euro at 10, the second volume encompasses “how 
European macro-economic governance responded to 
the early phases of the post-August 2007 financial crisis 
and its mutation from September 2008, especially after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, into full-scale global 
financial and economic crisis” (V. II, p. 4).  
 The two volumes are a remarkable achievement 
since it is the first time that the most important and 
some controversial official documents that discuss 
economic governance in the EU and have led to EMU 
construction are collected and published in two volumes 
and analyzed in a chronological and systematic way. 
A large set of official documents is made available in 
English—various documents have been translated from 
other languages such as French or German. The two 
volumes are not just a collection of documents on EU 
economic governance. They also contain commentaries 
on each section that combine various documents under 
specific theme. Dividing the documents into sections 
and analytical commentaries provided by Dyson and 
Quaglia helps the reader form a better understanding of 
the original documents. Yet, it seems to me that Dyson 
and Quaglia tried to achieve too much in these two vol-
umes. The authors sought to strike a balance between 
having a reference manual and an analytical commen-
tary, which led them to have the documents divided into 
sections, and somehow it does not work very well. In my 
opinion, the commentaries do not offer any controversial 
or new understanding of the original documents that we 
do not already know. Besides, the commentaries read 
more as a summary of the literature on EMU creation 
and performance with the original documents used as 
supporting references. What would have been helpful 
is to have real commentaries on the documents as op-
posed to a summary of well-known analyses. It would 
have been nice to draw out any new understanding of 
the treaties, and highlight if these original sources bring 
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different insights than those already established in the 
academic literature. 
 It is hard to cover all the documents that dealt with 
EMU since pre-1945 in two volumes. Therefore, Dyson 
and Quaglia had to establish selection criteria for what 
constitutes a key document (“relevant provisions from 
major agreements, conventions and treaties”; related 
EC/EU, EMU, “European Monetary Institute (EMI), and 
ECB legal instruments” in addition to “ECJ rulings”; 
relevant “interviews, letter, speeches, and minutes” 
of meetings”; “individual proposals […that] have trig-
gered and enriched relevant debates”; and member 
states documents that have “relevant contributions” (V. 
I, pp.8-9; V. II, pp. 14-15)). They chose the following 
four selection criteria: “legal competences”, documents 
focus on “why European macro-economic governance, 
based on EMU, developed in particular way that it did”; 
have significant and “innovative contributions”; and 
finally to be of historically relevant, important and not 
easily accessible (V. I, p. 9; V II, pp. 15-16). Although 
the selection criteria are important, however, they are 
too vague and the authors could have spent more time 
discussing their selection criteria. How do we define 
and measure historically important documents? Is it 
because of their ability to influence the EU agenda re-
gardless of the outcome, or does the outcome matter? 
The volumes suffer from repetition; for example, sig-
nificant parts of the introductions to Volumes I and II 
are identical. Section 4 in V. II, which deals with the 
Exchange Rate policy, is strongly related to the parts 
on external representation, enlargement and monetary 
policy, as highlighted by Dyson and Quaglia (V. II, p. 
316). To avoid repetition and to offer a better under-
standing of these issues, why not put these sections in 
one section and analyze them as they interact together 
rather than having them in separate sections?
 Despite these minor shortcomings of the two vol-
umes, European Economic Governance and Policies 
offers an ‘from A to Z’ type encyclopedia on the de-
velopment of economic and monetary governance in 
the EU in general and the creation and functioning of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in particular. The 
two volumes are very important for anyone interested in 
tracing the evolution of EU economic governance back 
to the main documents rather than relying on secondary 
literature.
Assem Dandashly, Freie Universität Berlin
Slapin, Jonathan B. Veto Power. Institutional Design 
in the European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 2011.
 This volume provides an examination of the politi-
cal dynamics of European integration in the specific 
context of the bargaining between the member states 
during European Union intergovernmental conferences 
(IGCs). Jonathan Slapin explores how member states 
can secure desired outcomes in the inter-state negotia-
tions that have become central to the conduct of IGCs, 
against the broader question of how states get what 
they want in international organisations when there is 
no exit option. Slapin presents intergovernmentalism 
and institutionalism as two competing theories of bar-
gaining power, the former emphasising state power and 
resources as crucial determinants of capacity to shape 
negotiations while institutionalism relies on the rules 
under which institutions operate, opening the way for 
those states to exercise veto rights whenever national 
preferences tend towards maintaining the status quo 
rather than to deepening integration. The author sug-
gests that the veto rights which are available to each 
member state provide a way in which any state can 
affect the negotiations in the IGCs, and in particular 
the small states without political influence can still 
secure the outcome they want. Veto rights matter in 
the absence of an exit option, since the other states 
cannot pressure the ‘laggard’ state to either leave the 
organisation or vote progressively, that is with those 
states that seek deeper integration. Slapin’s main 
contention is that institutional theories can better ex-
plain IGC outcomes, and that domestic politics affect 
intergovernmental bargaining through the process of 
ratification (either through national parliaments or by 
public referendum) and the ability of domestic actors 
(including national public opinion) to affect member 
state bargaining preferences. Referring to the exten-
sive literature in political science, Slapin argues that 
institutional design matters to the political relations 
among states, and to the type of policy-making that 
is produced under the formalised rules that govern 
inter-state bargaining. The issue of veto power is 
then considered in the IGC negotiations conducted 
through 1996-1997 over the Amsterdam Treaty, and 
Slapin presents the results of a quantitative analysis of 
the preferences of the member states, as well as the 
European Commission and the European Parliament 
on 228 issues tabled in the IGC negotiations. Chapter 
two of the book provides a detailed discussion of the 
methodological approach and summarises the position 
of each member state on the individual issue areas. 
Chapter three presents the formal theoretical model 
used by the author to test the competing predictions of 
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intergovernmentalism and institutionalism, while chap-
ter four provides a detailed description of how the model 
was tested. Chapter five identifies the winners and los-
ers in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, though the 
conclusions regarding the individual national positions 
are unlikely to surprise those who retain a watching brief 
over national politics and positions on matters of Euro-
pean integration. In fact, the conclusion that domestic 
politics matter in the international negotiations had al-
ready been demonstrated in previous IGC negotiations, 
and would do so again in the negotiations over the Nice 
and the Lisbon treaties. Appropriately to a study that 
supports the institutionalist explanation of European 
integration, chapter six reports on the bargaining among 
the member states over the voting weights in the EU 
Council of Ministers and the size of the European Com-
mission. These two contentious issues remained unre-
solved in the lead up to the 2004/2007 enlargements, 
but the pressures from the smaller states to exercise 
their veto power and to retain the status quo against 
the demands from the larger states, notably France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK, to change the weighted 
voting system in the Council continued to resonate 
more than a decade after the Amsterdam Treaty was 
finally adopted. Chapter seven discusses the viability 
of veto power in intergovernmental negotiations, and 
draws on Albert Hirschman’s work on the interaction of 
exit and voice to propose that where voluntary exit (or 
forced expulsion) is an option, there is less possibility 
for a state to exercise veto power and more likelihood 
that a state resistant to change may be forced to accept 
sub-optimal outcomes forced upon it by other states. 
Chapter eight reviews the exit threat/veto power options 
in the case of the British Labour government’s threat 
to leave the European Community in 1974, and the 
debate over the British budget rebate under Margaret 
Thatcher in the course of the negotiations towards the 
Single European Act in the early 1980s. Slapin argues 
that Thatcher’s use of veto power could be explained by 
the other states’ calculations of the costs of not agreeing 
to her demands, in the calculation of possible missed 
institutional outcomes in the future if Britain was not 
there to support a Franco-German position. However, 
this discussion fails to consider the strong support by 
Thatcher for the market-widening strategy of the Single 
European Act, a policy that was very much in line with 
the neo-liberal policies launched by the UK Conserva-
tive government from the early 1980s. There was no 
need for the British prime minister to threaten exit from 
an expanding European market considered to be in 
line with national preferences by the government and 
domestic business interests. 
 The discussion of exit options offers some insight 
into the difficult situation facing the member states as 
the EU seeks to identify ways out of the financial and 
sovereign debt crisis that escalated throughout 2011. 
Jonathan Slapin’s view is that laggard states may be 
powerful in resisting change even without the ability to 
threaten exit from the union, but this depends, as he 
rightly recognises, on the reaction of the other states 
seeking change. If these states do not really want the 
laggard states, then exclusion may become an option 
– and indeed recent EU treaty revision now provides 
an exit clause. At the start of 2012, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the status of several countries in the eurozone 
and the continued weaknesses across the European 
financial sector may prompt the German and French 
leaders to review the exit options more trenchantly.
 This strength of this volume lies in the application of 
political science and a quantitative analysis to capture 
the inter-state bargaining and the use of veto power to 
shape negotiation outcomes, where Slapin’s method-
ological approach occupies a central place in the work. 
However, the book is limited to a snapshot of inter-state 
politics in the negotiations over the Amsterdam Treaty, 
which the author admits fell short of expectations. IGCs 
are only one arena in which European politics are con-
ducted, and recent experience points to the continued 
importance of a range of factors that shape European 
integration, ranging from power politics to domestic 
forces, institutional rules, and global pressures, all of 
which interact in very complex ways to shape the dy-
namics of European integration. This complexity that 
adheres to the interplay of European political forces 
demands that we continue to take account of the social 
and political context in which European actors engage 
at national and international levels, and that we consider 
the historical and temporal influences on preference 
formation, and interest determination. As the construc-
tivist approach in international relations emphasises, 
national interests are not pre-determined or unchang-
ing but can be socially constructed in the dialogue and 
communication of social actors. There may be scope 
in this approach to explore when and how veto power 
might change over time, and how veto power might vary 
in different interstate bargaining settings.
Mary Farrell, University of Greenwich 
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 Now in its eighth edition, this seminal work on the 
organisation, working methods, and powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) is fully revised to take into account 
the changes resulting from the 2009 European elections 
and the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. Similar to 
earlier editions, the book is divided into three parts. 
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Part 1 provides ‘The Framework’, describing the main 
features of the EP in comparison to other legislatures 
and how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
are being elected. It also discusses issues arising from 
the EP’s commitment to multilingualism and the distri-
bution of its work between Strasbourg, Luxembourg, 
and Brussels. Part 2 deals with ‘The Actors and Work-
ing Structures’, starting with the background, role, and 
motivations of individual MEPs. Subsequent chapters 
deal with the composition, organisation, and operation 
of political groups, the EP leadership, committees, inter-
parliamentary delegations, the plenary, intergroups, and 
the secretariat, respectively. Finally, Part 3 covers ‘The 
Powers of the Parliament’. This part includes chapters 
on the role and prerogatives of the EP in the legislative 
process, in the adoption of the budget, in the appointment 
and dismissal of the Commission and the leadership of 
other EU organisations and agencies, and in scrutinizing 
delegated and implementing acts of the Commission. 
Other chapters outline Parliaments connections and 
communication channels to other European Union (EU) 
institutions and its openness towards interest groups, 
media, and ordinary citizens, as well as the role of na-
tional parliaments in EU law-making and their relations 
to the EP before and after the Lisbon treaty. Finally, the 
book concludes with a discussion of how the EP affected 
constitutional change over the years through its influence 
on successive treaty reforms.
 As the outline of the book’s content indicates, it 
probably provides the most comprehensive and cur-
rently up-to-date description of the European Parlia-
ment. Given the breadth of material covered, ranging 
from rather minute administrative details to politically 
salient powers, readers with different backgrounds will 
inevitably find some topics more interesting or relevant 
than others. From a political science perspective, I found 
the discussion of issues involving the selection of a 
uniform electoral system, the evolution of the political 
group system, the composition and roles of intergroups, 
the advantages and disadvantages of informal trilogues 
under the ordinary legislative procedure, the operation 
of the new budgetary procedure, and the varying ap-
pointment powers regarding different EU agencies most 
stimulating, often suggesting interesting questions for 
further research. 
 A big strength of this book is that it presents a wealth 
of factual information that is useful for teaching and re-
search. Amongst other things, it provides tables on the 
electoral systems in use in different member states, the 
national voter turnout in EP elections, the gender balance 
in Parliament, the current national party membership in 
political groups, previous political experience of MEPs 
and their subsequent uptake of positions in the Com-
mission or national governments, the details of current 
and often also past occupants of leadership positions in 
party groups, committees, inter-parliamentary delega-
tions, and the EP as a whole, and the applicability of 
legislative procedures in different policy areas - including 
a reference to the relevant treaty article and an indica-
tion of which areas have been newly included in the 
scope of the ordinary legislative procedure by the Lisbon 
treaty. The book also includes lists of cases in which 
the EP used its right to formally request a Commission 
proposal and in which it tabled a motion of censure of 
the Commission. Finally, the appendix provides tables 
of all European elections results for member states 
since the first direct election in 1979. The value of the 
book as a source of statistics and qualitative information 
would have been even greater if it had provided direct 
references to primary sources. The appendix includes a 
general pointer to the EP’s website and a bibliography 
of selected academic work on different aspects of the 
Parliament. However, to check the accuracy and pos-
sibly extend the information provided in the book, direct 
pointers to the relevant source material would have been 
useful.
 In terms of substance, the book provides largely 
descriptive information and generally balanced discus-
sions of the pros and cons of different features of the 
EP. Most of its claims are not controversial. The excep-
tion in that respect is Chapter 18 on the EP’s influence 
on constitutional change in the European Union. After a 
description of the involvement and the positions taken 
by the EP with respect to treaty changes, the chapter 
concludes that the ‘successive treaty revisions since 
Parliament became directly elected were all strongly 
influenced by the European Parliament’. This conclu-
sion stands in stark contrast to most other academic 
work on the topic, which stresses the role of member 
states and possibly that of the Commission. Although the 
chapter succeeds in demonstrating that most constitu-
tional changes successively agreed by member states 
in intergovernmental treaties were often also sought by 
the European Parliament, it provides little evidence for 
the claim that Parliament was able to convince ‘at least 
some national governments to press its case’. Alternative 
theories of constitutional change and the possibility that 
the EP was just lucky rather than powerful - by holding 
the same position as the truly powerful actors - are not 
ruled out by the analysis.
 However, these minor weaknesses cannot do away 
from the overall contribution of the book. As the current 
European Council President Herman van Rompuy puts 
it in his foreword, this is ‘the authoritative guide to the 
European Parliament’. It is probably not a book to be 
read from cover to cover, but it is definitely a must-have 
reference work for anybody interested in the workings 
of the European Parliament and the political system of 
the EU in general.
Frank Haege, University of Limerick
